We present syntactic characterisations for the union closed fragments of existential second-order logic and of logics with team semantics. Since union closure is a semantical and undecidable property, the normal form we introduce enables the handling and provides a better understanding of this fragment. We also introduce inclusion-exclusion games that turn out to be precisely the corresponding model-checking games. These games are not only interesting in their own right, but they also are a key factor towards building a bridge between the semantic and syntactic fragments. On the level of logics with team semantics we additionally present restrictions of inclusion-exclusion logic to capture the union closed fragment. Moreover, we define a team based atom that when adding it to first-order logic also precisely captures the union closed fragment of existential second-order logic which answers an open question by Galliani and Hella.
Introduction
One branch of model theory engages with the characterisation of semantical fragments, which typically are undecidable, as syntactical fragments of the logics under consideration. Prominent examples are van Benthem's Theorem characterising the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic as the modal-logic [10] or preservation theorems like the Łoś-Tarski Theorem, which states that formulae preserved in substructures are equivalent to universal formulae [7] . In this paper we consider formulae ϕ(X) of existential second-order logic, Σ 1 1 , in a free relational variable X and investigate the property of being closed under unions, meaning that whenever a family of relations X i all satisfy ϕ, then their union i X i should also do so. Certainly closure under unions is an undecidable property. We provide a syntactical characterisation of all formulae of existential second-order logic obeying this property via a normal form called myopic-Σ 1 1 , a notion based on ideas of Galliani and Hella [2] . By Fagin's Theorem, Σ 1 1 is the logical equivalent of the complexity class NP which highlights the importance to understand its fragments. Towards this end we employ game theoretic concepts and introduce a novel game type, called inclusion-exclusion games, suited for formulae ϕ(X) with a free relational variable. In these games a strategy no longer is simply winning for one player -and hence proving whether a sentence is satisfied -but it is moreover adequate for a certain relation Y over A showing that the formula is satisfied by A and Y , in symbols A ϕ(Y ). We construct myopic-Σ 1 1 formulae that can define the winning regions of specifically those inclusion-exclusion games that are (semantically) closed under unions. Conceptually such games are eligible for any Σ 1 1 -formula, but since our interest lies in those formulae that are closed under unions, we introduce a restricted version of such games, called union games, that precisely correspond to the model-checking games of union closed Σ 1 1 -formulae. Consequently, the notion of union closure is captured on the level of formulae by the myopic fragment of Σ 1 1 and on the game theoretic level by union games.
Existential second-order logic has a tight connection to modern logics of dependence and independence that are based on the concept of teams, introduced by Hodges [6] , and later refined by Väänänen in 2007 [9] . In contrast to classical logics, formulae of such a logic are evaluated against a set of assignments, called a team. One main characteristic of these logics is that dependencies between variables, such as "x depends solely on y", are expressed as atomic properties of teams. Widely used dependency atoms include dependence (=(x, y)), inclusion (x ⊆ y), exclusion (x | y) and independence (x⊥y). It is known that both independence logic FO(⊥) and inclusion-exclusion logic FO(⊆, | ) have the same expressive power as full existential second-order logic Σ 1 1 [1] . The team in such logics corresponds to the free relational variable in existential second-order formulae, enabling us to ask the same questions about fragments with certain closure properties in both frameworks. One example of a well understood closure property is downwards closure stating that if a formula is satisfied by a team then it is also satisfied by all subteams (i.e. subsets of that team). It is well known that exclusion logic FO( | ) corresponds to the downwards closed fragment of Σ 1 1 [1, 8] . The issue of union closure is different. Galliani and Hella have shown that inclusion logic FO(⊆) corresponds to greatest fixed-point-logic GFP + and, hence, by using the Immerman-Vardi Theorem, it captures all Ptime computable queries on ordered structures [2] . They also proved that every union closed dependency notion that itself is first-order definable (where the formula has access to a predicate for the team) is already definable in inclusion logic. However, there are union closed properties that are not definable in inclusion logic (think of a union closed NP property). For a concrete example we refer to the atom R from [2] . Thus Galliani and Hella asked the question whether there is a union closed atomic dependency notion β, such that the logic FO(β) captures precisely the union closed fragment of FO(⊆, | ). In the present work we answer this question positively with the aid of inclusionexclusion games. Furthermore, we present a syntactical restriction of all FO(⊆, | ) formulae that also precisely describe the union closed fragment. This syntactical fragment corresponds to myopic-Σ 1 1 and is in harmony with the game theoretical view, which is described by union games.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal with second-order logic, while the other sections, 6 and 7, address logics with team semantics. In section three the central notion of this paper, inclusionexclusion games, are introduced, which are used in section four to characterise the union closed fragment within existential second-order logic. Section five provides a restriction of the games specifically suited for this fragment. The sections dealing with team semantics can be read mostly independently of each other. Based on section four, section six describes the union closed fragment of inclusion-exclusion logic in terms of syntactical restrictions. The question of Galliani and Hella, whether there is a union closed atom that constitutes the union closed fragment, is answered positively in section seven, for which the reader should be familiar with union games introduced in section five.
Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with first-order logic and existential second-order logic, FO and Σ 1 1 for short. For a background we refer to the textbook [4] . The neighbourhood of a vertex v in a graph G is denoted by N G (v). For a graph G = (V, E) and a set F ⊆ V × V the extension of G by F is denoted by G + F := (V, E ∪ F ). For a given τ -structure A and formula ϕ(x) we define ϕ A := {ā : A ϕ(ā)}, free(ϕ) is the set of free first-order variables and subf(ψ) is the set of subformulae of ψ. Notations likev,w always indicate thatv = (v 1 , . . . , v k ) andw = (w 1 , . . . , w ℓ ) are some (finite) tuples. Here k = |v| and ℓ = |w|, sov is a k-tuple whilew is an ℓ-tuple. We write {v} or {v,w} as abbreviations for
is the set consisting of the two tuplesv andw (as elements). The concatenation ofv and w is (v,w) := (v 1 , . . . , v k , w 1 , . . . , w ℓ ). The power set of a set A is denoted by P(A) and P + (A) := P(A) \ {∅}.
Team Semantics
A team X over A is a set of assignments mapping a common domain dom(X) = {x} of variables into A. 1 The restriction of X to some first-order formula ϕ(x) is X↾ ϕ := {s ∈ X : A s ϕ}. For a given subtupleȳ = (y 1 , . . . , y ℓ ) ⊆x and every s ∈ X we define s(ȳ) := (s(y 1 ), . . . , s(y ℓ )). Furthermore, we frequently use X(ȳ) := {s(ȳ) : s ∈ X}, which is an ℓ-ary relation over A. For an assignment s, a variable x and a ∈ A we use s[x → a] to denote the assignment resulting from s by adding x to its domain (if it is not already contained) and declaring a as the image of x. ◮ Definition 1. Let A be a τ -structure, X a team of A. In the following λ denotes a first-order τ -literal and ϕ, ψ arbitrary formulae in negation normal form.
Team semantics for a first-order formula ϕ (without any dependency concepts) boils down to evaluating ϕ against every single assignment, i.e. more formally we have A X ϕ ⇐⇒ A s ϕ for every s ∈ X (in usual Tarski semantics). This is also known as the flatness property of FO. The reason for considering teams instead of single assignments is that they allow the formalisation of dependency statements in the form of dependency atoms. Among the most common atoms are the following.
These are called dependence [9] , inclusion, exclusion [1] and independence [5] atoms, respectively. When we speak about a logic that may use certain atomic dependency notions, for example inclusion, we denote it by writing FO(⊆) and so forth. These logics have the empty team property, which means that A ∅ ϕ is always true. This is also the reason why sentences are not evaluated against ∅ but rather against {∅}, which is the team consisting of the empty assignment. Let ϕ be a first-order formula and ψ be any formula of a logic with team semantics. We define ϕ → ψ as nnf(¬ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ) where nnf(¬ϕ) is the negation normal form of ¬ϕ. It is easy to see that A X ϕ → ψ ⇐⇒ A X↾ϕ ψ.
Union Closure A formula ϕ of a logic with team semantics is said to be union closed if
FO Interpretations A first-order interpretation from σ to τ of arity k is a sequence I = (δ, ε, (ψ S ) S∈τ ) of FO(σ)-formulae, called the domain, equality and relation formulae respectively. We say that I interprets a τ -structure B in some σ-structure A and write B ∼ = I(A) if and only if there exists a surjective function h, called the coordinate map, that maps δ A = {ā ∈ A k : A δ(ā)} to B preserving and reflecting the equalities and relations provided by ε and ψ S , such that h induces an isomorphism between the quotient structure (δ A , (ψ A S ) S∈τ )/ε A and B. A more detailed explanation can be found in [4] . For a τ -formula ϕ we associate the σ-formula ϕ I by relativising quantifiers to δ, using ε as equality and ψ S instead of S. We extend this translation to Σ 1 1 by the following rules for additional free/quantified relation symbols S.
(∃Sϑ)
∈ N, and we define h(Q) := {(h(ā 1 ), . . . , h(ā ℓ )) : (ā 1 , . . . ,ā ℓ ) ∈ Q}, which is the ℓ-ary relation over B that was described by Q. The connection between ϕ I and ϕ is made precise in the well-known interpretation lemma.
Inclusion-Exclusion Games
Classical model-checking games are designed to express satisfiability of sentences, i.e. formulae without free variables. Since our focus lies on formulae in a free relational variable we are in need for a game that is able to not only express that a formula is satisfied, but moreover that it is satisfied by a certain relation. In the games we are about to describe a set of designated positions is present -called the target set -which corresponds to the full relation A k (where the free relational variable has arity k). A winning strategy is said to be adequate for a subset X of the target positions, if the target vertices visited by it are X. On the level of logics this matches the relation satisfying the corresponding formula, i.e. there is a winning strategy adequate for X if and only if the formula is satisfied by X.
An inclusion-exclusion game G = (V, V 0 , V 1 , E, I, T, E ex ) is played by two players 0 and 1 where V σ is the set of vertices of player σ,
is a set of possible moves, I ⊆ V is the (possibly empty) set of initial positions, T ⊆ V is the set of target vertices and E ex ⊆ V × V is the exclusion condition, which defines the winning condition for player 0. 2 The edges going into T , that is E in := E ∩ (V × T ), are called inclusion edges, while E ex is the set of exclusion edges (sometimes also called conflicting pairs). Inclusion-exclusion games are second-order games, so instead of single plays we are more interested in sets of plays that are admitted by some winning strategy for player 0.
For a subset X ⊆ T the aim of player 0 is to provide a winning strategy (which can be viewed as a set of plays respecting the exclusion condition and containing all possible strategies of player 1) such that the vertices of T that are visited by this strategy correspond precisely to X. ◮ Definition 3. A winning strategy (for player 0) S is a possibly empty subgraph S = (W, F ) of G = (V, E) ensuring the following four consistency conditions.
Intuitively, the conditions (i) and (ii) state that the strategy must provide at least one move from each node of player 0 used by the strategy but does not make assumptions about the moves that player 1 may make whenever the strategy plays a node belonging to player 1.
In particular, the strategy must not play any terminal vertices that are in V 0 . Furthermore, (iii) enforces that at least the initial vertices are contained while (iv) disallows playing with conflicting pairs (v, w) ∈ E ex , i.e. v and w must not coexist in any winning strategy for player 0. If I = ∅, then (∅, ∅) is the trivial winning strategy. Since we do not have a notion for a winning strategy for player 1, inclusion-exclusion games can be viewed as solitaire games. Of course, the winning condition of an inclusion-exclusion game G is first-order definable. The formula ϕ win (W, F ) has the property that G ϕ win (W, F ) if and only if (W, F ) is a winning strategy for player 0 in G, where
describes the winning condition imposed on the graph (W, F ).
We are mainly interested in the subset of target vertices that are visited by a winning strategy S = (W, F ). More formally, S induces T (S) := W ∩ T , which we also call the target of S. This allows us to associate with every inclusion-exclusion game G the set of targets of winning strategies: T (G) := {T (S) : S is a winning strategy for player 0 in G}.
Intuitively, as already pointed out, games of this kind will be the model-checking games for Σ 1 1 -formulae ϕ(X) that have a free relational variable X. Given a structure A and such a formula, we are interested in the possible relations Y that satisfy the formula, in symbols (A, Y ) ϕ(X). We will construct the game such that Y satisfies ϕ if and only if there is a strategy of player 0 winning for the set Y ⊆ T , thus T (G) = {Y : (A, Y ) ϕ}. It will be more convenient for our purposes that the target vertices of an inclusion-exclusion game are not required to be terminal positions. However it would be no restriction as it is easy to transform any given game into one that agrees on the (possible) targets, in which all target vertices are terminal.
One can reduce the satisfiability problem of propositional logic to deciding whether player 0 has a winning strategy in an inclusion-exclusion game.
◮ Theorem 4. The problem of deciding whether X ∈ T (G) for a finite inclusion-exclusion game G is NPcomplete.
Proof. Determining whether X ∈ T (G) holds is clearly in NP, as the winning strategy can be guessed and verified in polynomial time.
For the NP-hardness we present a reduction from the satisfiability problem of propositional logic. Let ϕ be formula in conjunctive normal form, i.e. ϕ = j≤m C j where C j = i L i is a disjunction of literals (variables or negated variables). The game G ϕ is constructed as follows. For every variable x we add two vertices (of player 1) x and ¬x connected by an exclusion edge. Moreover, for every clause C j we add a vertex, belonging to player 0, which has an outgoing edge into each literal L i occurring in it. There are no initial vertices, i.e. I := ∅ and the target set T is the set of all clauses C j of ϕ. Now, S ∈ T (G) if and only if Cj ∈S C j is satisfiable. In particular, T ∈ T (G ϕ ) if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. ◭
Model-Checking Games for Existential Second-Order Logic
In this section we define model-checking games for formulae ϕ(X) ∈ Σ 1 1 with a free relational variable. These games are inclusion-exclusion games whose target sets are precisely the sets of relations that satisfy ϕ(X). 
These games capture the behaviour of existential second-order formulae which provides us with the following theorem. Proof. First let (A, X) ϕ = ∃Rϕ ′ (X,R). Then there exist relationsR such that (A, X,R) ϕ ′ (X,R). So player 0 wins the (first-order) model-checking game G ′ := G((A, X,R), ϕ ′ (X,R)).
Let S ′ = (W ′ , F ′ ) be a winning strategy for player 0 in G ′ and S := (W, F ) where W := W ′ ∪ X and F := F ′ ∪ {((Xx, s),ā) ∈ V × V :ā ∈ X and s(x) =ā}. Clearly we have that T (S) = W ∩ T = X. To conclude this direction of the proof, we still need to prove that S is indeed a winning strategy in G := G X (A, ϕ). The required properties for player 0 and 1, that is (i) and (ii) of Definition 3, are inherited from S ′ for every node of the form (ϑ, s) ∈ V \ T with ϑ = Xx. For nodes of the form v = (Xx, s) ∈ W we have that v ∈ V 0 and, because of v ∈ W ′ and the fact that S ′ is a winning strategy in G ′ , s(x) ∈ X must follow. As result,
is the initial position of G ′ and, hence,
In order to prove that the last remaining condition, the exclusion condition (iv), is satisfied, consider any (v, w) ∈ E ex . Then there are two possible cases:
Then either v or w is a losing position for player 0 in G ′ . As a result, W ′ does not contain both v and w and, thus, neither
which results from S by removing all nodes from A ar(X) and by deleting all edges leading into A ar(X) .
We prove that S ′ is a winning strategy for player 0 in the first-order model-checking game G ′ := G((A, X,R), ϕ ′ (X,R)). First of all, the conditions for player 0 and 1 for non-terminal positions are inherited from S. For the same reason we also have (ϕ ′ , ∅) ∈ V (S ′ ). We still need to prove that S ′ contains only terminal positions that are winning for player 0. This in inherited for all terminal position that are not using any R i nor X. We will now investigate the other terminal positions, i.e. positions of the form
is a winning position for player 0 in G ′ . In the case that S ′ visits (¬R ix , s), we know that (¬R ix , s) ∈ W and, because S respects the exclusion condition, a position of the form (R iȳ , s ′ ) with s ′ (ȳ) = s(x) cannot be in W . So, in this case, we have that s(x) / ∈ R i and, hence, (¬R ix , s) is again a winning position for player 0. If S ′ contains v := (Xx, s), then the edge (v, s(x)) is played by S and, consequently, s(x) ∈ W ∩ T = T (S) = X which shows that v is a winning position for player 0 in G ′ . If, however, (¬Xx, s) is played by S ′ , then (¬Xx, s) ∈ W and, due to exclusion condition, s(x) / ∈ W which proves that s(x) / ∈ W ∩ T = X and, again, (¬Xx, s) is a winning for player 0 in G ′ . As a result, we have that (A, X) ϕ. ◭
Characterising the Union Closed Formulae within Existential Second-Order Logic
In this section we investigate formulae ϕ(X) of existential second-order logic that are closed under unions with respect to their free relational variable X. Union closure, being a se-mantical property of formulae, is undecidable. However, we present a syntactical characterisation of all such formulae via the following normal form.
Variants of myopic formulae have already been considered for first-order logic [2, Definition 19] and for greatest fixed-point logics [3, Theorem 24 and Theorem 26], but to our knowledge myopic Σ 1 1 -formulae have not been studied so far. Let U denote the set of all union closed Σ 1 1 -formulae. To establish the claim that myopic formuale are a normal form of U we need to show that all myopic formulae are indeed closed under unions and, more importantly, that every union closed formula can be translated into an equivalent myopic formula. This translation is in particular constructive.
We split the proof into two parts, the direction from right to left is handled in Proposition 9 and from left to right in Theorem 11.
◮ Proposition 9. Every myopic formula is union closed.
Sinceā was chosen arbitrarily, this property holds for allā ∈ X, hence the claim follows. ◭ For a fixed formula ϕ(X) the corresponding game G X can be constructed by a first-order interpretation depending of course on the current structure.
and r := ar(X). Then there exists a quantifier-free interpretation I such that G X (A, ϕ) ∼ = I(A) for every structure A (with at least two elements).
Proof. The construction we use in this proof is similar to the one from [3, Proposition 18 ]. An equality type e(v) over a tuplev = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is a maximal consistent set of (in)equalities using only variables fromv. Since equality types over finitely many variables are finite, we can, by slight abuse of notation, identify e(v) with the formula e(v). Let n be chosen sufficiently large so that we can fix for every ϑ ∈ subf(ϕ ′ ) ∪ {T } a unique equality type e ϑ (v).
will be encoded by an (n + m)-tuple of the form (ū,ā) whereū has equality type e ϑ and s(x i ) = a i for every x i ∈ free(ϑ), while a position of the formā ∈ T (= A r ) will be encoded by (ū,āb) such thatū has equality type e T whereasb ∈ A m−r can be an arbitrary tuple. Now we are in the position to define the interpretation 3 That is under an even number of negations.
be closed under unions, A be a τ -structure and G := G X (A, ϕ) be the corresponding game. W.l.o.g. A has at least two elements. By Theorem 6, we have that T (G) = {Y ⊆ A r : A ϕ(Y )} where r := ar(X). Since ϕ(X) is union closed, it follows that T (G) is closed under unions as well. Now we observe that T (G) can be defined in the game G by the following myopic formula:
Here ϕ win is the first-order formula verifying winning strategies. Please note that ϕ T is indeed a myopic formula, since X occurs only positively in ψ T .
Proof. Assume that (G, X) ϕ T (X). By construction of ϕ T , for everyā ∈ X there exists a winning strategy Sā = (Wā, Fā) withā ∈ Wā and T (Sā) = Wā ∩ T ⊆ X. It follows that X = ā∈X T (Sā). Since T (G) is closed under unions, we also obtain that X ∈ T (G).
We want to remark that at this point the semantical property is translated into a syntactical one, as the formula only describes the correct winning strategy because the initial formula was closed under unions.
To conclude the proof of Claim 12, assume that X ∈ T (G). Then there exists a winning strategy S = (W, F ) for player 0 with T (S) = X. Thus, for the quantifiers ∃W ∃F we can (for allā ∈ X) choose S, which, obviously, satisfies the formula. ⊳
Recall the first-order interpretation I (of arity n + m) from Lemma 10 with I(A) ∼ = G for some coordinate map h :
is some quantifier-free first-order formula. By the interpretation lemma for Σ 1 1 (Lemma 2), for every X ⊆ T (G),
where X ⋆ := h −1 (X) is a relation of arity (n + m). Recall that every variable x occurring in ϕ T is replaced by a tuplex of length (n + m). Letx = (ū,v,w) where |ū| = n, |v| = r and |w| = m − r and let
where ψ ⋆ is the formula that results from ψ I T by replacing every occurrence of X ⋆ū′v′w′ (where |ū ′ | = n, |v ′ | = r and |w ′ | = m − r) by the formula e T (ū ′ ) ∧ Xv ′ . By construction, this is a myopic formula, because X occurred only positively in ψ I and, hence, X ⋆ (resp. X) occurs only positively in
By construction of ψ ⋆ , these are the only subformulae in which ψ I T and ψ ⋆ differ from each other. As a result, the following claim is true:
⊲ Claim 13. For every X ⊆ A r and every assignment s : free(ψ I T ) → A, holds
Recall thatx = (ū,v,w) where |ū| = n, |v| = r and |w| = (m − r). Now we can see that
As a result, we have that
Putting everything together yields:
Thus, the constructed myopic formula µ(X) is indeed equivalent to ϕ(X). ◭ This construction can be applied to non union closed formulae as well, in which case the statement becomes (A, i∈I X i ) µ ⇐⇒ (A, X i ) ϕ for all i ∈ I. To see this replace Claim 12 by "For every 
Union Games
In the previous section we have characterised the union closed fragment of Σ 1 1 by means of a syntactic normal form. Now we aim at a game theoretic description, which leads to the following restriction of inclusion-exclusion games that reveals how union closed properties are assembled.
◮ Definition 14. A union game is an inclusion-exclusion game
G = (V, V 0 , V 1 , E, I, T, E ex ) obeying the following restrictions. For every t ∈ T the subgraph reachable from t via the edges E \ E in , that are the edges of E that do not go back into T , is denoted by G △ t . 5 These components must be disjoint, that is V (G △ t ) ∩ V (G △ t ′ ) = ∅ for all t = t ′ ∈ T .
Furthermore, exclusion edges are only allowed between vertices of the same component, that is
The set of initial positions is empty, i.e. I = ∅.
See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of a union game. Since the exclusion edges are only inside a component we can in a way combine different strategies into one, which is the reason the target set of a union game is closed under unions.
◮ Theorem 15. Let G be a union game and (S i ) i∈J be a family of winning strategies for player 0. Then there is a winning strategy S for player 0 such that T (S) = i∈J T (S i ). In other words, the set T (G) is closed under unions.
). In words, S is defined on every component G △ t with t ∈ U as an arbitrary strategy S t that is defined on G △ t , including the inclusion edges leaving this component. By definition T (S) = U and, furthermore, S is indeed a winning strategy since it behaves on every component G △ Notice that there are still edges from (Xx, s,ā) to s(x) -the inclusion edges. It is also worth mentioning that the empty set is always included in T (G(A, µ) ) for all myopic µ because (∅, ∅) is a (trivial) winning strategy for player 0. This mimics the behaviour that in case X = ∅, the formula ∀x(Xx → ψ) is satisfied regardless of everything else. The analogue of Theorem 6 holds for union games and myopic formulae. 
In words, the strategy S combines all first-order strategies together and adds the reached inclusion edges. By definition T (S) = X. Whenever a node of the form (Xȳ, s,ā) is visited in S we have that s(ȳ) ∈ X (because otherwise S FŌ a would not be a winning strategy for player 0) and hence ( (Xȳ, s,ā 
) is a move that is available to player 0. That S ′ satisfies the conditions for a winning strategy on the other nodes is inherited from the fact that the individual strategies are winning strategies on the first-order part. As pointed out before, each strategy does not visit an exclusion edge.
For the contrary, let S be a winning strategy with T (S) = X. For everyā ∈ X let b ∈ Rā if and only if there is some (Rx, s,ā) ∈ V (S) with s(x) =b. We have to show that A ϕ(X,Rā,ā) for allā ∈ X. But there is nothing to do here because S↾ G △ a induces a winning strategy for the first-order model-checking game for (A, X,Rā),x →ā, ϕ . ◭
We want to end this section with the remark that for other fragments with certain closure properties natural restrictions of inclusion-exclusion games exist. Especially, forbidding exclusion edges at all leads to model-checking games for inclusion logic, while forbidding inclusion edges results in games suited for exclusion logic.
Myopic Fragment of Inclusion-Exclusion Logic
Similarly to the normal form of union closed Σ 1 1 -formulae (see section 4) we present syntactic restrictions of inclusion-exclusion logic FO(⊆, |) that correspond precisely to the union closed fragment U 6 . Analogously to myopic Σ 1 1 -formulae we will also present a normal form for all union closed FO(⊆, | )-formulae. (b) Every exclusion atom occurring in ϕ is of the formxȳ |xz. (c) Every inclusion atom occurring in ϕ is of the formxȳ ⊆xz orȳ ⊆x, where the latter is only allowed if it is not in the scope of a disjunction. Please note that ϕ(x) must not have any additional free variables besidesx. We call atoms of the formxȳ ⊆xz orxȳ |xz (x-)guarded andȳ ⊆z, respectivelyȳ |z, the corresponding unguarded versions. Analogously, we call a formula ψ the unguarded version of ϕ, if ψ emerges from ϕ by replacing every dependency atom by the respective unguarded version.
The intuition behind this definition is that everyx-myopic formula can be evaluated componentwise on every team X↾x =ā = {s ∈ X : s(x) =ā} for allā ∈ X(x). For a formula ϕ let T ϕ denote its syntax tree 7 . A (team-)labelling of T ϕ is a function λ mapping every node v ψ to a team λ(v ψ ) whose domain includes free(ψ). In the following we write λ(ψ) instead of λ(v ψ ) if it is clear from the context which occurrence of the subformula ψ of ϕ is meant. We call λ a witness for A X ϕ, if λ(ϕ) = X and the semantical rules of Definition 1 are satisfied (e.g. λ(ψ ∨ ϑ) = λ(ψ) ∪ λ(ϑ)) and for every literal β of ϕ we have A λ(β) β. By induction, if λ is a witness for A X ϕ, then for every ψ ∈ subf(ϕ) we have A λ(ψ) ψ and, moreover, A X ϕ if and only if there is a witness λ for A X ϕ.
For every subformulav ⊆x of ϕ and witness λ for A X ϕ we have (λ(v ⊆x))(x) = X(x).
Proof. We prove the first item. Let A Xxv ⊆xw. That means for every assignment s ∈ X there is another one, s ′ ∈ X, with s(xv) = s ′ (xw). Thus s(x) = s ′ (x) and therefore s ∈ X↾x =ā ⇐⇒ s ′ ∈ X↾x =ā from which A X↾x=āv ⊆w follows for allā ∈ X(x). Now assume A X↾x=āv ⊆w for allā ∈ X(x) and let s ∈ X be an arbitrary assignment. Since A X↾x =s(x)v ⊆w there is an assignment s ′ ∈ X↾x =s(x) with s ′ (w) = s(v). This means s(xv) = s ′ (xw), and because s was arbitrary, A Xxv ⊆xw follows.
We prove the second item. The third item follows from the simple fact thatx is never quantified and that those atoms are not in the scope of a disjunction, hence the values ofx are preserved. ◭ Like union games anx-myopic formula is evaluated componentwise, which leads to the union closure of this fragment.
◮ Theorem 20. Let ϕ(x) ∈ FO(⊆, | ) bex-myopic and A Xi ϕ for all i ∈ I. Then A X ϕ for X = i∈I X i .
Proof. Let λ i be a witness for A Xi ϕ and every i ∈ I. For everyā ∈ X(x) choose iā ∈ I such thatā ∈ X iā (x). Define λ(ψ) := ā∈X(x) λ iā (ψ)↾x =ā for every ψ ∈ subf(ϕ). We show that λ is a witness for A X ϕ. It is not difficult to see that the requirements on witnesses for composite formulae are satisfied. We prove that the requirements for the literals are fulfilled as well. By the flatness property, first-order literals are satisfied by λ.
We prove now that A λ(γ) γ for γ =xv ⊆xw or γ =xv|xw. Let γ ′ be the corresponding unguarded formula, that is the formula resulting from γ by removingx, i.e. we have γ ′ = v ⊆w or γ ′ =v |w. Due to Proposition 19, it suffices to prove that A λ(γ)↾x=ā γ ′ is true for everyā ∈ (λ(γ))(x). Notice that λ(γ)↾x =ā = λ iā (γ)↾x =ā . Since λ iā is a witness for A Xiā ϕ, it must be the case that A λiā (γ) γ. By Proposition 19, it follows that A λiā (γ)↾x =b γ ′ for everyb ∈ (λ iā (γ))(x). Ifā ∈ (λ iā (γ))(x), then this implies that A λiā (γ)↾x=ā γ ′ . Otherwise we have that λ iā (γ)↾x =ā = ∅ and then A λiā (γ)↾x=ā γ ′ follows from the empty team property of FO(⊆, | ). In both cases, A λiā (γ)↾x=ā γ ′ holds as desired, which concludes the proof of A λ(γ) γ.
We still need to prove that A λ(γ) γ for literals of the form γ =v ⊆x ∈ subf(ϕ).
whereforeb ∈ X iā (x) ⊆ X(x) and, consequently, we have chosen some index ib ∈ I with b ∈ X ib (x). By Proposition 19 again, it follows that
It remains to prove that indeed every union closed formula ϕ of FO(⊆, | ) is equivalent to somex-myopic formula. As we have already seen in Theorem 8, every union closed formula of existential second-order logic is equivalent to some myopic Σ 1 1 -formula. Moreover, it is well known that every FO(⊆, | )-formula can be translated into an equivalent Σ 1 1 -formula [1] . Such a formula can be expressed as anx-myopic one of the form ∃s(s ⊆x ∧ ψ) where ψ uses onlyx-guarded atoms. 
Proof. By induction on ψ and applying Proposition 19. ◭
We present two different proofs for the next theorem, which bring a myopic Σ 1 1 -formula into this normal form. The following proof is based on methods of Galliani, Kontinen and Väänänen [1, 8] while the other one resembles the proof of Theorem 11 and can be found in subsection 6.1.
◮ Theorem 22. Let ϕ(X) be a myopic Σ 1 1 -formula. There is an equivalentx-myopic formula of FO(⊆, | ) where |x| = ar(X).
Proof. First of all let us introduce a normal form of myopic Σ 1 1 -formulae. Since in myopic formulae the variable X may occur only positively in the subformula ϕ ′ , we can transform every ∀x(Xx → ∃Rϕ ′ (R, X,x)) into the equivalent formula ∀x(Xx → ∃S(S ⊆ X ∧∃Rϕ ′ (R, S,x) )), where S ⊆ X is a shorthand for ∀ȳ(Sȳ → Xȳ). We now apply the Skolem-normal form of Σ 1 1 -formulae to ∃Rϕ ′ (R, S,x) , which yields the formula σ(S,x) := ∃f ∀ȳ((f 1 (w) = f 2 (w) ↔ Sw)∧ψ(f ,x,ȳ)), where ψ is a quantifier-free first-order formula andw is a subtuple ofȳ and, moreover, every f i occurs in σ only with a unique tuplew i (consisting of pairwise different variables) as argument, that is f i (w i ) (see [8] where an analogous construction is made). The original formula can thus be transformed into ∀x(Xx → ∃S(S ⊆ X ∧ σ(S,x))). Similarly to [1] we embed σ(S,x) into inclusion-exclusion logic as ϑ(s,x) := ∀ȳ∃z i =(xw i , z i )∧((xw ⊆ xs∧z 1 = z 2 )∨(xw|xs∧z 1 = z 2 ))∧ψ ′ (x,ȳ,z) . Here ψ ′ is obtained from ψ by simply replacing every occurrence of f i (w i ) = f j (w j ) by z i = z j . The only difference in our case is that every dependency atom isx-guarded due to the fact that the subformula at hand is inside the scope of the universally quantified variablesx in ∀x(Xx → . . . ). Notice that dependence atoms of the form =(xw i , z i ) can also be regarded asx-myopic. Formally, we can embed such an atom into exclusion logic via the formula ∀v(xw i v |xw i z i ∨ z i = v), which has the intended shape [1] . The whole formula ϕ(X) thus translates into µ(x) := ∃s(s ⊆x ∧ ϑ(s,x)). Let ϑ ′ (s,x) be the unguarded version of ϑ(s,x). Analogously to the argumentation of Galliani [1] by additionally making use of Proposition 19, we see that 
Alternative Proof
The proof of Theorem 22 uses a translation into a special Skolem-normal form that in the end produces a lot of guarded in-/exclusion atoms. We can prevent this by using a different proof technique that similar to the proof of Theorem 22 exploits that winning strategies of union games are definable in the myopic fragment of FO(⊆, | )-formulae and that the model-checking games of myopic formulae are first-order interpretable. The rest of this section is organised as follows. First, we define target sets of a union game by a myopic FO(⊆, | )-formula, then we adapt the interpretation lemma for logics with team semantics and finally present the alternative proof of Theorem 22. 
It is not difficult to verify that these formulae are just expressing the conditions for winning strategies (cf. Definition 3). More formally, we have the following claim:
⊲ Claim 25. Let G be an inclusion-exclusion game and Y be a non-empty team over G with y ∈ dom(Y ). Then G Y ψ win (y) if and only if Y (y) is the vertex set of a winning strategy for player 0 in G.
With these formulae at hand, it is easy to define the target sets in FO(⊆, | ):
⊲ Claim 26. Let G be an inclusion-exclusion game and let X be a non-empty team over G with z ∈ dom(X). Then G X ψ T (z) if and only if X(z) ∈ T (G).
. By Claim 25 and G Y ψ win (y), we have Y (y) = V (S) for some winning strategy S. We prove that 
We claim (and prove) that ϑ T (x) defines the target sets in union games which, more formally, means that for every team X over some union game G with x ∈ dom(X) holds G X ϑ T ⇐⇒ X(x) ∈ T (G). 8 To see this, let ζ ′ be the corresponding unguarded version of ζ, which turns out to be the following formula:
⊲ Claim 28. Let G be an inclusion-exclusion game and let X be a non-empty team over G with x, x ′ ∈ dom(X). Then G X ζ ′ (x, x ′ ) if and only if X(x) ⊆ X(x ′ ) ∈ T (G).
Proof. Follows immediately from Claim 26. ◭
With this claim at hand, we can prove that ϑ T really defines what we promised:
be a union game and let X be a team with
Proof. For X = ∅ the claim is true, because ∅ ∈ T (G) is true for every union game and G ∅ ϑ T is due to the empty team property. Let X = ∅. Applying Lemma 21 immediately yields the equivalence of the following statements:
. Next we will prove that the following propositions are also equivalent: (c) For every t ∈ X(x) exists a winning strategy S t with t ∈ T (S t ) ⊆ X(x).
For the converse direction assume (c). Since G is a union game, we are allowed to use Theorem 15 to combine the family (S t ) t∈X(x) into a single winning strategy S with T (S) = t∈X(x) T (S t ) which is, due to assumptions about T (S t ), equal to X(x). ⊳ So we have already established that (a) ⇐⇒ (b) and (c) ⇐⇒ (d), but our goal was to show that (a) ⇐⇒ (d) which is exactly what Claim 29 states. Thus, in order to complete our proof of Claim 29, we just have to verify the missing link (b) ⇐⇒ (c).
"(b) =⇒ (c)": Suppose that there is some function F : X → P + (V ) such that (bi) and (bii) are true. So G Xt ζ ′ (x, x ′ ) for every t ∈ X(x) which, by Claim 28, yields that
which, by definition of T (G), leads to the existence of winning strategies S t with X t (x ′ ) = T (S t ) for every t ∈ X(x). Because of (bi) we can also conclude that X t (x ′ ) = s∈X↾x=t F (s) ⊆ X(x). As a result, we obtain t ∈ T (S t ) ⊆ X(x) for every t ∈ X(x) as desired.
"(b) ⇐= (c)": We assume now that for every t ∈ X(x) there exists some winning strategy S t with t ∈ T (S t ) ⊆ X(x). Define F : X → P + (V ) as F (s) := T (S s(x) ) -notice that s(x) ∈ T (S s(x) ) holds by assumption, so F is indeed well-defined. Then (bi) is true, because for every s ∈ X we have also assumed that T (S s(x) ) ⊆ X(x). Because F (s) depends only on s(x) and we have X t (x) = {t}, it follows that X t (x ′ ) = T (S t ). As a result, we have X t (x) = {t} ⊆ T (S t ) = X t (x ′ ) from which immediately follows that X t (x) ⊆ X t (x ′ ) ∈ T (G) for every t ∈ X(x). Thus, by Claim 28, we obtain G Xt ζ ′ (x, x ′ ) for every t ∈ X(x), which is exactly (bii). ◭
Now we have already one component, the x-myopic formula ϑ T (x), that is needed for the alternative proof of Theorem 22. However, we still require an interpretation lemma for FO(⊆, | ). Towards this end, consider a τ -formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ FO(⊆, | ) and some firstorder interpretation I = (δ, ε, (ψ) S∈τ ). The formula ϕ I is defined as in section 2, whereas the occurring in-/exclusion atoms are handled as follows: 
can be viewed as the "full" team describing Y . Of course, different tuples of the base structure A may encode the same element of the target structure B, thus Y usually contains redundant assignments. For the same reason, two (well-formed) teams X = X ′ (with the same domain and co-domain A) may describe the same team over B. We say that X and X ′ are h-similar, if h(X) = h(X ′ ).
◮ Lemma 31 (Similarity Lemma). Let X, X ′ be well-formed teams that are h-similar. Then:
Proof. Since X, X ′ are h-similar, we have h(X) = h(X ′ ). By the interpretation lemma,
Now we have all the tools assembled that are needed for the alternative proof of Theorem 22.
Alternative Proof of Theorem 22. Let ϕ(X) be a myopic Σ 1 1 -formula. We are going to find aȳ-myopic formula µ(ȳ) ∈ FO(⊆, | ) with (A, X(ȳ)) ϕ(X) ⇐⇒ A X µ(ȳ) for every τ -structure A and every team X withȳ ⊆ dom(X). In the following let A be a τ -structure chosen arbitrarily. In Definition 16 we have defined the model-checking game G := G(A, ϕ) for A and ϕ(X). By Proposition 17, we know for every relation X ⊆ A r that:
Due to Claim 29 we may conclude for every team X with x ∈ dom(X):
By combining (3) and (4), we obtain that for every team X with x ∈ dom(X) over G:
Notice that G X ϑ T (x) implies that X(x) ⊆ T (G) = A r and, hence, X(x) is then actually a relation of the correct arity for the formula ϕ(X).
Using the technique of Lemma 10, it is possible to devise a (quantifier-free) interpretation I = (δ, ε, ψ V0 , ψ V1 , ψ E , ψ I , ψ T , ψ Eex ) such that G ∼ = I(A) with coordinate map h : δ A → V (G). This interpretation encodes a position of the game G as a tuple (ū,v) ∈ A n+m where the n-tupleū has a certain equality type (indicating at which type of position we are encoding, e.g. at which formula we are) while the m-tuplev stores certain values (e.g. values of free variables and to which component the node belongs). More importantly, a positionā ∈ T (G) = A r is described by the tuple (ū,ā,b) ∈ A n+m whereū has equality type e T whilē b ∈ A m−r can be chosen arbitrarily. Also recall that every variable v is replaced by an (n + m)-tuplev of pairwise different variables. In particular, letx = (ū,ȳ,z) whereū is a n-tuple,ȳ some r-tuple andz an (m − r)-tuple.
Every inclusion/exclusion atoms occurring in ϑ T has one of the following three possible forms where v, w are some variables:
x Notice that the only inclusion atom of the form of β 3 is in ϑ T not within the scope of a disjunction (it is x ′ ⊆ x right after the existential quantifier). In ϑ I T , these formulae are replaced by:
Clearly, these formulas are not allowed inȳ-myopic formulae, because the occurring inclusion/exclusion atoms are notȳ-guarded. However, we know that the tuplex = (ū,ȳ,z) is used in ϑ I T to store elements from h −1 (T (G)) = {(v,ā,b) ∈ A n+m : A e T (ū),ā ∈ A r ,b ∈ A m−r }, because whenever a team Y interpretsx by values encoding different game positions, it follows that h(Y )(x) cannot be a target set of a winning strategy, so Claim 29 leads to G h(Y ) ϑ T (x) and then, by the Interpretation Lemma (Lemma 30), A Y ϑ I T . So for every team X which is well-formed (w.r.t. I) and satisfies A X ϑ I T we must have that A X ψ T (x) = e T (ū). This observation enables us to define versions of β I i that are allowed inȳ-myopic formulae: (1) ) ∧v (2) ⊆ȳ wherev =v (1) 
. Then we can observe that
but the equivalence of A X ′x ′v′ |xw and A X ′ȳv ′ |ȳw requires proof.
we have that s(ȳ) = s(ȳ ′ ) for every s ∈ X ′ . Now, we prove the two directions of A X ′ x ′v′ |xw ⇐⇒ A X ′ȳv ′ |ȳw separately: "⇐": First, assume that A X ′ȳv ′ |ȳw. It follows that s 1 (ȳ ′v′ ) = s 1 (ȳv ′ ) = s 2 (ȳw) for every s 1 , s 2 ∈ X ′ . Becauseȳ andȳ ′ are subtuples ofx = (ū,ȳ,z) resp.x ′ = (ū ′ ,ȳ ′ ,z ′ ), this implies that s 1 (x ′v′ ) = s 2 (xw) for every s 1 , s 2 ∈ X ′ . Hence, A X ′x ′v′ |xw.
"⇒": Now let A X ′x ′v′ |xw. Towards a contradiction assume that A X ′ȳv ′ |ȳw. Then there are assignments s 1 , s 2 ∈ X ′ with s 1 (ȳv ′ ) = s 2 (ȳw). Since X(x) ⊆ h −1 (T ) it follows that A e T (s 1 (ū)) ∧ e T (s 2 (ū)). Because we also have A X ′ ε(x,x ′ ), it must be the case that
. s 1 and s ′ 1 only differ onū ′ andz ′ , but both still encode the equality type e T inū ′ while the values ofz ′ are irrelevant. So we still have
, which is impossible due to A X ′x ′v′ |xw. Contradiction! Therefore, A X ′ȳv ′ |ȳw must be true. i = 2: "⇐": First let A X β ⋆ 2 . Then there is a function F :
Then there is a function F : X → P + (A 2(n+m) ) such that
The structures A and B. The structure A = (V, E A , F A , P A , Q A ) on the left side uses two different kinds of edges: the dashed edges belong to F , while the other are E-edges. Furthermore, A exhibits two predicates P, Q. The structure B = (V, E B ) depicted on the right is just a directed graph. Please notice that both structures are using the same universe V .
Optimality of the Myopic Fragment of Inclusion-Exclusion Logic
One might ask whether the restrictions of Definition 18 are actually imperative to capture the union closed fragment. In this section, we will show that neither condition can be dropped and that every single atom of Definition 18 is required to express all union closed properties.
We start by showing that neither condition can be dropped. First of all, it is pretty clear that exclusion atoms have to bex-guarded, because x 1 | x 2 is not guarded and obviously not closed under unions. Furthermore, it is clear that the variables amongx must not be quantified. This points out the necessity of conditions (a) and (b) of Definition 18. In the next example we demonstrate that neither restriction of condition (c) can be dropped.
◮ Example 34. Consider the structures A and B drawn in Figure 2 and the following formulae:
Neither ϕ(x) nor ψ(x) is x-myopic, because the inclusion atom v ⊆ x from ϑ occurs inside the scope of a disjunction (and it is not x-guarded), while the atom x ⊆ w is neither xguarded nor of the form that is allowed outside the scope of disjunctions, because x appears on the wrong side of the inclusion atom.
For every v ∈ V let s v : {x} → V be the assignment with s v (x) := v. We define the teams X 1 := {s a , s b }, X 2 := {s b , s c } and X := X 1 ∪ X 2 = {s a , s b , s c }. It is not difficult to verify that A Xi ϕ(x) and B Xi ψ(x) for i = 1, 2 but A X ϕ(x) and B X ψ(x). In particular, neither ϕ(x) nor ψ(x) is closed under unions. This shows that the restrictions of Definition 18 are indeed necessary.
Thus the atoms allowed in Definition 18 are sufficient to capture the union closed fragment of FO(⊆, | ). On the contrary, one may ask whether the set of atoms given in Definition 18 is necessary. Let us argue for all rules of Definition 18.
Assume that all exclusion atoms are forbidden. Then every formula is already in inclusion logic in which one cannot define every union closed property as was shown by Galliani and Hella [2, p. 16 ].
If inclusion atoms were only allowed in the formxȳ ⊆xz, that means the atomsȳ ⊆x are forbidden, the formulae become flat, as can be seen by considering Proposition 19, but not all union closed properties are flat.
The case where inclusion atoms of formxȳ ⊆xz are forbidden is a bit more delicate. To prove that such a formula cannot express every union closed property consider the formula µ(x) = ∃z(z ⊆ x ∧ ∀y(Exy → xy ⊆ xz)), where τ = {E} for a binary predicate symbol E. This formula axiomatises the set of all teams X over a graph G = (V, E) such that whenever v ∈ X(x) and (v, w) ∈ E, then already w ∈ X(x). The formula obviously describes a union closed property. Consider the graph G: a b c. Here, G X µ(x) for precisely those teams X that satisfy "a ∈ X(x) implies b, c ∈ X(x)". For every v ∈ V (G) let s v be the assignment x → v and let X v := {s v }. Furthermore, we define X abc := {s a , s b , s c }.
Let ψ(x) be an x-myopic formula in which the construct xȳ ⊆ xz does not appear. So the only inclusion atoms occurring in ψ(x) are of the form z ⊆ x, which are not allowed in the scope of disjunctions. Notice that z cannot be universally quantified, as the team X b = {s b } satisfies the described property, but not ∀z(z ⊆ x). Thus we may assume without loss of generality that ψ(x) has the form ∃z(z ⊆ x ∧ ψ ′ (x, z)), where in ψ ′ (x, z) no atom of the kind z ′ ⊆ x occurs. We want to remark that the following argumentation can be adapted to the slightly more general case that multiple atoms of form z ⊆ x occur, but for sake of simplicity we only deal with one such atom. Let η(x, z) be the unguarded version of ψ ′ (x, z). By Lemma 21, there is a function F :
Moreover, because in η(x, z) no inclusion atom occurs it is downwards closed. Assume a ∈ F (s a ). By downwards closure of η(x, z) we obtain G Xa[z →a] η, which, by Lemma 21, implies that G Xa ψ contradicting our assumption that ψ describes the desired property. Otherwise, because of symmetry, b is in F (s a ), and hence G Xa[z →b] η. Additionally, since G X b ψ we know, by Lemma 21, that G X b [z →b] η. Together this implies G X ab [z →b]↾x=v η for v = a, b and, due to Lemma 21, we get G X ab ψ which is again in conflict with our assumption about ψ describing the desired property.
An Atom capturing the Union Closed Fragment
The present work was motivated by a question of Galliani and Hella in 2013 [2] . Galliani and Hella asked whether there is a union closed atomic dependency notion α that is definable in existential second-order logic such that FO(α) corresponds precisely to all union closed properties of FO(⊆, | ). In [2] they have already shown that inclusion logic does not suffice, as there are union closed properties not definable in it. Moreover, they have established a theorem stating that every union closed atomic property that is definable in first-order logic (where the formula has access to the team via a predicate) is expressible in inclusion logic. Thus, whatever atom characterises all union closed properties of FO(⊆, | ) must axiomatise an inherently second-order property. Intuitively speaking, as we have seen in section 5, solving union games is a complete problem for the class U. Therefore, a canonical solution to this question is to propose an atomic formula that defines the winning regions in a union game. Towards this we must describe how a game can be encoded into a team. This is not as straightforward as one might think, because there is a technical pitfall we need to avoid. The union of two teams describing union games, each won by player 0, might encode a game won by player 1, but by union closure it must satisfy the atomic formula.
We encode union games in teams by using variable tuples for the respective components, where we also encode the complementary relations in order to ensure that the union of two different games cannot form a different game. For k ∈ N let V k be the set of distinct k-tuples
◮ Definition 35. Let X be a team with V k ⊆ dom(X) and codomain A. We define ∼:= X(ε 1 ,ε 2 ) and A X := (V, V 0 , V 1 , E, I, T, E ex ) with the following components.
If the following consistency requirements are satisfied, then we define G A
Otherwise, if any of these requirements is not fulfilled, we let G A X be undefined.
It is easy to observe that G A X is undefined for every incomplete team X. Furthermore complete subteams of teams describing a game actually describe the same game and the same congruence relation.
◮ Lemma 36. Let X, Y be teams with codomain
Proof. Suppose that X is complete, X ⊆ Y and G A Y is defined. First, we prove that G A X is defined. Towards this end, we prove that X satisfies the consistency requirements of Definition 35. By completeness of X, we know already that
Thus, we have X(ū) ∪ X(ū ∁ ) = A k and X(ū) ∩ X(ū ∁ ) = ∅, which implies that X(ū ∁ ) = A k \ X(ū). This proves condition (1) of Definition 35. The proof for (2)-(6) is very analogous.
Towards proving the remaining conditions (7)-(9), it suffices to show that A X = A Y and ∼ X = ∼ Y , because G A Y is defined and thus the conditions (7)-(9) must be true for A Y and ∼ Y .
Thus, we need to prove that
Since the argumentation is very analogous for these different tuples, we prove this only forȳ =ū. Towards a contradiction, assume that X(ū) = Y (ū). Since X and Y are complete, we can conclude that X(ū ∁ ) = A k \ X(ū) and Y (ū ∁ ) = A k \ Y (ū). Since X(ū) = Y (ū), we have that Y (ū) \ X(ū) = ∅ or X(ū) \ Y (ū) = ∅. In the first case, follows
In the second case, a similar line of thought leads to ∅ = X(ū) \ Y (ū) ⊆ Y (ȳ) ∩ Y (ū ∁ ). In both cases we have
Therefore, all conditions of Definition 35 are fulfilled. Because of A X = A Y and ∼ X = ∼ Y , it is even the case that G A X = A X
Now let us show that union games are definable in plain first-order logic with team semantics in the sense of Definition 35.
◮ Lemma 37. Let ϕ(X) = ∀x(Xx → ∃Rϕ ′ (X,R,x)) be a myopic Σ 1 1 -formula and ψ(V k ,x) be a formula with team semantics (where k is large enough such that the game G(A, ϕ) can be encoded). There is a formula ϑ ψ ϕ (x) such that A X ϑ ψ ϕ ⇐⇒ A Y ψ for some team Y extending X with G A Y ∼ = G(A, ϕ) and X(x) = Y (x), for every τ -structure A.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 10, it is easy to construct a (quantifier-free) first-order interpretation I := (δ, ε, ψ V , ψ V0 , ψ V1 , ψ E , ψ I , ψ T , ψ Eex ) with I(A) ∼ = G(A, ϕ). Now let ϑ ψ ϕ (x) := ∀V k (γ(V k ) → ψ(V k ,x)) where the formula
enforces that the game G(A, ϕ) will be "loaded" into the team. As long as none of these conjuncts are unsatisfiable this construction is correct. This is safe to assume because one can easily transform a union game into an equivalent one w.r.t. the target set such that none of its components are empty. ◭ This knowledge enables us to finally define the atomic formula we sought after. For this we need to show that the atom is union closed and its first-order closure can express all of U.
◮ Definition 38. The atomic team formula ∪−game(V k ,x) for the respective tuples of variables has the following semantics. For non-empty teams X with V k ,x ⊆ dom(X) we define A X ∪−game(V k ,x):⇐⇒ X is complete and if G A X is defined, then X(x) /X(ε1,ε2) ∈ T (G A X ) and we set A ∅ ∪−game(V k ,x) to be always true (to ensure the empty team property).
Note that this atom can be defined in existential second-order logic.
◮ Proposition 39. The atomic formula ∪−game is union closed.
Proof. Assume that A Xi ∪−game(V k ,x) for i ∈ I. We prove that A X ∪−game(V k ,x) holds for the union X := i∈I X i . If X = ∅, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise at least one X j is non-empty and, since A Xj ∪−game(V k ,x), X j must be complete implying that X is also complete (because X ⊇ X j ). For the remainder of this proof, we assume w.l.o.g. that all involved teams X i (and X) are non-empty. If G A X is undefined, then A X ∪−game(V k ,x) follows from the definition of ∪−game. Otherwise, if G A X is defined, then we can use Lemma 36 to obtain that G A X = G A Xi and ∼ := X(ε 1 ,ε 2 ) = X i (ε 1 ,ε 2 ) for every i ∈ I. Since A Xi ∪−game(V k ,x), we can conclude that X i (x) /∼ ∈ T (G A Xi ) = T (G A X ) for each i ∈ I. By Theorem 15, X(x) /∼ = i∈I X i (x) /∼ ∈ T (G A X ) and, hence, A X ∪−game(V k ,x). ◭ Proof. Let A be an arbitrary structure. Due to [1, Theorem 6.1] there exists a formula ϕ ′ (X) ∈ Σ 1 1 which is logically equivalent to ϕ(x) in the sense that A X ϕ(x) ⇐⇒ (A, X(x)) ϕ ′ (X) for every team X withx ⊆ dom(X). By Theorem 8, there is a myopic formula µ ≡ ϕ ′ . So, we have (A, X(x)) µ(X) ⇐⇒ A X ϕ(x).
The game G(A, µ) from Definition 16 is a union game and Lemma 37 allows us to load this game into a team. Please notice, that Lemma 37 is using a similar first-order interpretation I as Lemma 10, which encodes a target vertexā ∈ T (G(A, µ) ) by tuples of the form (ū,ā,w) of length k = n + m where the n-tupleū has the equality type e T whilew is an arbitrary tuple of length m − |ā|. Let ψ(V k ,x) := ∀ū∀w(e T (ū) → ∪−game(V k ,ūxw)) and ζ(x) := ϑ ψ µ be as in Lemma 37, that is
As in Lemma 37, we have G A Y ∼ = I(A) ∼ = G(A, µ) and X(x) = Y (x). µ) is a well-defined union game, this is equivalent to Z(ūxw) /∼ ∈ T (G A Y ). Let h : δ A I → V (G(A, µ) ) be the coordinate map for G(A, µ) ∼ = I(A). By construction, h induces an isomorphism between A Y /∼ and G(A, µ). In particular each element of any equivalence class [(ū ′ ,ā,w ′ )] ∼ ∈ Z(ūxw) /∼ is mapped by h toā. Therefore, Z(ūxw) /∼ ∈ T (G A Y ) ⇐⇒ Z(x) = X(x) ∈ T (G(A, µ) ). Thus we have A X ζ(x) ⇐⇒ X(x) ∈ T (G(A, µ) ). Putting everything together, we have A X ζ(x) ⇐⇒ X(x) ∈ T (G(A, µ)) ⇐⇒ (A, X(x)) µ ⇐⇒ A X ϕ(x) as desired. ◭
Furthermore, we have defined G
A Y = A Y /∼ where ∼ := Y (ε 1 ,ε 2 ). Because of the construction of ψ, we have A Y ψ(V k ,x) ⇐⇒ A Z ∪−game(V k ,ūxw) where Z := Y [ū → e A T ,w → A m−|x| ]. Since G A Z = G A Y ∼ = G(A,
Concluding Remarks
Let us remark on the "naturalness" of the atom ∪−game. Certainly inclusion, exclusion and the notions alike can be regarded as natural atomic dependency formulae, whereas the just introduced atom has to be classified differently. Nevertheless, it is a canonical candidate since it solves a complete problem of the desired class. Of course, a more natural -and more usable -atom might be found, but it will not be as simplistic as e.g. inclusion for Galliani and Hella have shown that every first-order definable union closed property is already expressible in inclusion logic. Hence, whatever atom one proposes, it must make use of some inherently second-order concepts. For concretely expressing properties, the introduced myopic fragments of Σ 1 1 and FO(⊆, | ) are more practical. The various syntactical characterisations of the union closed fragments presented in this work now enables their further investigation. This could result in a complexity theoretical analysis or a more detailed classification of Σ 1 1 .
